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Judicial Independence Through the Lens of
Bush v. Gore: Four Lessons from Political Science
HOWARD GILLMAN*
This article explores lessons about judicial independence that might be culled
from the 2000 election litigation. It treats judicial independence as related to the
more general practice ofproviding decision-making insulation to certain policy-
making institutions and discusses a variety of political motivations and
consequences that might be associated with such a practice. Four points are
emphasized and illustrated with reference to the litigation leading to the Bush v.
Gore decision. First, the decision to grant independence to a policy-making
institution often has as much to do with insulating preferred political agendas
from electoral pressure as with ensuring impartial decision-making. Second,
independent courts are often supported by other power-holders because they can
act as a forum within which contentious political questions may be channeled.
Third, even nominally independent decision-makers must assess their political
context before choosing politically riky courses of action. Finally, there is no
necessary relationship between the degree of a judge's decision-making
autonomy and the likelihood that she or he will engage in good-faith
interpretations of the law.
INTRODUCTION
The experiences with the 2000 election litigation, particularly the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore,1 illustrate aspects of judicial
independence that may be overlooked if too much focus is placed on linking the
concept to the simple virtue of pressure-free, good-faith judging. This article
explores the advantages of discussing judicial independence as if it was a subset
of the more general practice of insulating policy-making institutions-like central
banks or regulatory commissions-from conventional political pressures or
mechanisms of political accountability. 2 Unfettered, neutral, professional
decision-making may be one outcome that is desired whenever such
independence is considered. However, these are not the only relevant political
considerations or the only likely political consequences.
* Professor of Political Science and Law, University of Southern California. The author
thanks Barry Friedman, Mark Graber, Michael Klarman, and Keith Whittington for their
assistance, and happily relieves them of any responsibility for the ideas expressed in this essay.
1 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2 For similar analyses of judicial politics and a review of the political science literature on
the creation of politically insulated policy-making institutions, see Ran Hirschl, The Political
Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four
Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 91, 102-05 (2000); Edward L. Rubin,
Independence as a Governance Mechanism, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 56, 69-77 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds.,
2002) [hereinafter JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE].
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This article adopts a "regime politics" or "dominant coalition" view of
institutional independence. This approach examines institutional structures,
including the organization of judicial power, in terms of the political advantages
for power-holders who are interested in promoting substantive political agendas.3
This angle of analysis is not necessarily more accurate than one that emphasizes
the relationship between judicial independence and values, such as the rule of law
or impartiality. Nonetheless, an exclusive focus on these familiar tropes limits our
field of vision. When too much focus is placed on judicial independence and the
rule of law, it might mistakenly appear as if high courts are designed to be
politically neutral. It is easy to forget that there is actually more room (by design)
for ideological decision-making in the United States Supreme Court than there
may be for policy-making institutions such as central banks, whose missions are
narrower or more well defined. 4
Bush v. Gore is a useful starting point for thinking about judicial
independence in terms of regime politics rather than the neutral application of
law. Few scholars have been willing to defend the decision as an exemplar of
impartial decision-making or as a stoic defense: of the rule of law in the face of
enormous political pressure, although some do make this argument.5 It is already
common to treat the case as an example of the sort of political agendas that might
be pursued from within an institution that enjoys insulation from conventional
mechanisms of political accountability. 6 Perhaps even those with a different view
might find value in some of this article's more general points about judicial
independence.
3 For additional examples of studies that place judicial politics in a larger political context,
see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use
Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 511 (2002); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 35 (1993); Barry R. Weingast, The
Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 245 (1997).
4 For a canonical treatment of the United States Supreme Court as an ideological policy-
making institution, see generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
5 See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Yet Another Article on Bush v. Gore, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 283
(2003)
6 Commentators disagree about what political agenda was being pursued. Some share
Judge Richard Posner's belief that the decision was a salutary effort to forestall a potential
constitutional crisis. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 3 (2001). Others believe that the conservative majority
let partisan preferences trump their normal views of the law. See HOwARD GILLMAN, THE
VOTES THAT COUNTED: How THE COURT DECIDED THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 185-89
(2001). Still, there is a widespread consensus of opinion that some sort of political analysis is
useful in understanding the Court's conduct during the 2000 election dispute.
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As this article will discuss, the analysis of Bush v. Gore reveals four major
lessons about judicial independence and the Supreme Court that are sometimes
overlooked in conventional discussions.
I. LESSON ONE:
THE DECISION TO GRANT INDEPENDENCE TO A POLICY-MAKING
INSTITUTION HAS AS MUCH TO Do WITH INSULATING PREFERRED
POLITICAL AGENDAS FROM ELECTORAL PRESSURE AS WITH
ENSURING IMPARTIALITY
It is a basic assumption of political science that the United States Supreme
Court is designed to be a national policy-making institution, not a forum for the
routine and neutral resolution of everyday disputes.7 Conventional ideological
and political considerations dominate staffing decisions.8 Justices may not always
act in a way that is preferred by the appointing president, but political
explanations usually exist for these relatively rare circumstances, 9 and they do not
undermine the basic point. As Terri Peretti stated, ideological voting by justices
"is not merely the arbitrary expression of a justice's idiosyncratic views [but]
[r]ather... is the expression and vindication of those political views deliberately
'planted' on the Court" by policy-conscious presidents and senators.10
Because dominant coalitions are largely successful at planting trustworthy
agents on the Supreme Court, the justices almost never engage in policy-making
that challenges those power-holders who are in a position to assault their nominal
independence. It is extremely rare, although not unheard of, for the Court to void
an act of a current or "live" national majority." It is more common for the
7 See TERRI JENNINGS PERET1I, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 71-73 (1999)
[hereinafter PERETTI, IN DEFENSE]. More recently, Peretti insists that if analysts persist in
linking judicial independence to political neutrality, we all should be "dubious about the
existence of judicial independence." Terri Jennings Peretti, Does Judicial Independence Exist?
The Lessons of Social Science Research, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 2, at 103.
8 For a discussion of the modem process, see DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF
JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECrION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 12-19
(1999).
9 Consider several political explanations for why justices do not always decide cases in a
way that reflects the preferences of appointing presidents. One explanation is that the
appointment may have been driven by non-ideological political considerations, such as
geographical balance (more important in the nineteenth century than the twentieth) or other
aspects of coalition politics. A second is that the President may face a Senate that does not share
the President's ideology and insists on a compromise candidate. Yet a third is that unanticipated
issues may arise after an appointment that expose viewpoint differences between presidents and
their appointees.
10 PERETrI, IN DEFENSE, supra note 7, at 133.
11 See Dahl, supra note 3 (providing a classical political science study of this issue); see
also Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L.
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justices to go after national legislation passed by a previous governing coalition or
to impose a national policy consensus on local or regional "outliers."' 2 In other
words, judicial independence, defined as decision-making autonomy, 13 is largely
a function of political alignment with potential adversaries rather than the
maintenance of political neutrality.
However, inter-institutional alignment is not always perfect. During periods
of prolonged inter-party competition, different political coalitions may control the
White House and Congress, or the House and the Senate, and the justices may
split among competing camps that reflect these broader, sustained divisions in the
political system. A working majority on the Supreme Court may find itself in and
out of sync with all or part of the federal government, especially if a wing of one
of the parties has made efforts to entrench a politically tenuous agenda within the
judiciary. 14 This condition does not necessarily put the Court's work at risk in the
short term because it is likely that the Court's effective majority may be able to
count on political allies who are in a position to veto any serious threats.
However, under these circumstances, the Court's policy-making agenda can be
placed at risk over the long term, especially if (a) that agenda is supported by only
a narrow majority; (b) justices in that majority may be close to retirement (or
worse); and (c) a chance exists that political opponents may take control of the
presidency and the Senate and thus be in a position to use the appointment
process to change the course of the Court's decision-making.
This is precisely the political context within which the 2000 election litigation
evolved. While the justices were not aligned into opposing camps in all cases, a
tenuous conservative majority emerged on several important constitutional issues,
especially when Justice Sandra Day O'Connor found herself in agreement with
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy,
and Clarence Thomas. Given the age and health of some of the justices, it seemed
likely that the 2000 election would determine whether their decision-making
agenda would be fortified (if Republicans controlled the next appointments) or
REv. 1, 7-18 (1996). For a similar analysis of the Marshall Court's decision-making, see Mark
A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party Politics, 12 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 229, 259-62 (1998).
12 The Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions might be the best example of "cleaning up"
legislation that was passed by earlier governing coalitions. The point about imposing a national
consensus on local or regional outliers has been famously developed by Michael J. Klarman.
See Klarman, supra note 11, at 7-18; see also Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial
Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEo. L.J. 491,502-09 (1997). For a similar account of
the Warren Court, see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
485-87 (2000).
13 For a defense of defining judicial independence as autonomy, see Charles M. Cameron,
Judicial Independence: How Can You Tell It When You See It? And, Who Cares? in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 2, at 135-38.
14 For an analysis of how economic nationalists in the post-Civil War Republican Party
pursued this agenda in the late nineteenth century, see Gillman, supra note 3.
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possibly rolled back (if Democrats were in control). In the wake of the election, it
was known that the incoming Senate would be evenly divided between
Republicans and Democrats, and this meant that the outcome of the presidential
election would determine which party controlled both the White House and the
Senate and, thus, the appointment of Supreme Court justices.' 5
Thinking about judicial independence simply in terms of neutral, rule-of-law
values, it may be a mystery why a narrow majority of Supreme Court justices
took the remarkable step of involving themselves in the 2000 election
controversy. It is possible to construct a story about how the justices were merely
seeking to ensure that all those involved played by the rules. However, if it is
accepted that the justices have personal and institutional interests in the
configuration of power in the rest of the federal government, then the
involvement of the Bush v. Gore majority can be seen as an -effort to create a
more favorable political climate for its (emergent but still vulnerable)
constitutional agenda-that is, a political climate that would be less likely to
trigger a negative response to conservative decisions and more likely to result in
the appointment ofjustices who would maintain or solidify this agenda.
On this view, the Court's involvement in the 2000 election was not
extraordinary simply because it revealed a rare instance of political bias. Political
bias (or, more generously, political perspective) is revealed routinely in the
ideological patterns of the justices' decision-making. 16. Rather, the Court's
involvement was extraordinary because it demonstrated the Court's fortuitous
ability to shape which candidates and parties would control the White House and
the Senate, and thus make it less likely that political opponents would be able to
interfere with its policy-making. Stated another way, this case is extraordinary
because the policy alignment between the Court and the political system, which
normally is established by the legislative and executive branches, was established
by the Court.
II. LESSON Two:
INDEPENDENT COURTS ARE OFTEN SUPPORTED BY OTHER POWER-
HOLDERS BECAUSE THEY CAN ACT AS A FORUM WITHIN WHICH
CONTENTIOUS POLITICAL QUESTIONS MAY BE CHANNELED
The desire of power-holders to insulate preferred political agendas is not the
only reason that they may have an interest in establishing or deferring to the
15 This was before it was imagined that Republican Senator Jim Jeffords would bolt from
the party and hand over control of the Senate to the Democrats.
16 1 have argued elsewhere, though, that what was different about the political dynamics of
the Court's involvement was its overt partisanship. The justices routinely decide cases on the
bases of their political ideologies, but it is not so common for the justices to set aside their
normal policy positions on issues such as federalism or equal protection to promote the interests
of a favored candidate. See GiLLMAN, supra note 6, at 185-206.
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authority of relatively autonomous policy-making institutions such as agencies,
commissions, central banks, or judicial bodies. Delegation is sometimes also a
mechanism by which elected office-holders attempt to achieve political benefits
by channeling contentious and potentially unpopular issues into the hands of
"expert" decision-makers. 17
The advantages of channeling are obvious when Congress sets up
institutions, such as base-closing commissions, which are exclusively designed to
facilitate decision-making on issues that raise: political problems for elected
officials. 18 More generally, institutions such as independent regulatory
commissions (including the Federal Reserve Board) are also structured to enable
more insulated policy-makers to pursue potentially controversial courses of action
(such as an increase in interest rates). Legislators even benefit when they delegate
more routine policy-making responsibilities to executive branch agencies.
Traditional constitutional analysts are not wrong when they point out that
delegation is often a natural and salutary part of the process by which the
executive branch concretizes policy goals that are established by the legislature.
However, this normative angle overlooks other political advantages for elected
officials. Legislators also benefit when they put themselves in a position to claim
credit for identifying important social problems without having to worry about the
political costs of actually adopting specific policies that might alienate favored
constituents. When bureaucracies adopt popular policies, legislators can take
credit for results; when those same bureaucracies make unpopular decisions,
legislators can join their constituents in complaining about bureaucrats and might
even take steps to humiliate or punish the offending bureaucrats.' 9
As a general rule, the insulation or independence of courts is not best
explained in terms of these political advantages. After all, most of what courts do
(especially lower courts) is of little or no interest to policy-makers (beyond a
general interest in relatively efficient case processing), which means that
deference to courts is normally a byproduct of the overall political banality of the
judiciary's work, rather than its sensitivity or salience. However, Mark Graber's
path-breaking discussion of legislative deference to the Supreme Court has made
it clear that under certain circumstances--such as the emergence of political
disputes that threaten to disrupt established partisan coalitions-the Supreme
Court's political insulation is self-consciously exploited by national party
leaders. 20 To illustrate, Graber develops the following case studies: (1) the interest
17 For an overview of the political calculations that go into the decision to delegate power,
see Stefan Voigt & Eli M. Salzberger, Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to
Delegate Powers, 55 KYKLOS 289 (2002).
18 See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510,
§§ 2901-2911, 104 Stat. 1808, 1808-19 (1990).
19 MoRRIs P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 67-
71(1977).
20 Graber, supra note 3, at 41.
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of beleaguered party leaders in the late 1850s to have the justices take the lead in
addressing slavery politics; (2) the assumption among Congressional leaders in
1890 that the Supreme Court would make the final determination on key aspects
of antitrust policy; and (3) the perceived advantages to national elites in the early
1970s for the justices to declare unconstitutional certain kinds of abortion
statutes.2' Some national political leaders in the 1950s may have believed that
federal courts were in a better position to address certain civil rights controversies
than other institutions of the national government.22 Additionally, conservatives
who might have felt some political pressure to vote for laws such as the Gun-Free
School Zone Act or the Violence Against Women Act may be silently grateful
that the Rehnquist Court is attempting to reduce Congress's authority to pass laws
for which they have little enthusiasm. 23 Whether this can be demonstrated in
these cases, the overarching point is that it would not be unusual for elected
officials to support courts when they insulate elected officials from having to
make controversial decisions.
The justices in the Bush v. Gore majority may have revealed their own
attachment to a political agenda when they decided to intervene in the presidential
election dispute. However, the unwillingness of other power-holders to defend
their own decision-making prerogatives suggests that they believed that there
were perceived political advantages to having the Supreme Court take control of
this dispute. Republican legislators in Florida were being pressured by legislative
leaders to take the controversial step of challenging the Florida courts by
appointing a new slate of Bush electors,24 but there was some grumbling about
the need to take this course of action, and there was a public expression of hope
21 See id. at 45-61.
22 The Truman Justice Department urged the Supreme Court to rule against segregated
schools in Brown v. Board of Education. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS:
RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 90 (2000). Federal courts also addressed
civil rights issues relating to workplace discrimination for decades ater the New Deal, during a
period when the Democratic Party felt constrained by its Dixiecrat contingent. See Paul Frymer,
Courts, Electoral Politics, and Civil Rights Enforcement: Racial Integration in U.S. Labor
Unions, 1935-1980, Lecture to the Washington University Department of Political Science
(March 2002) (transcript on file with author) (arguing that, during this period, "while elected
officials consistently avoided challenging union racism, courts succeeded in integrating resistant
unions," in part because "elected officials during this time delegate[d] a great deal of
institutional power to courts").
23 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
24 The New York Times reported on November 23, 2000 that "senior Republican
legislators, led by men with strong political ties to the state's governor, Jeb Bush, searched with
a partisan intensity today for a legislative stroke that would deliver Florida and the White House
to George W. Bush." David Barstow & Somini Sengupta, Florida Legislators Consider
Options to Aid Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at AI; see also CORRESPONDENTS OF THE
N.Y. TIMES, 36 DAYS: THE COMPLETE CHRONICLE OF THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
CRISIS 139 (John W. Wright et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter 36 DAYS].
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that the Washington justices would make it unnecessary for them to go on record
with that vote.25 Similarly, Republican congressional leaders had been preparing
for some weeks to take control of the outcome: in the event that Florida courts
were able to complete a recount that resulted in a Gore victory, but there was not
a lot of enthusiasm for this outcome, and a number of Republicans publicly
expressed the view that they would prefer it if the Supreme Court resolved the
issue first.26 It is reasonable to assume that the justices were quite aware that
those other power-holders who might claim the prerogative to resolve the dispute
nevertheless were in support of channeling the process into the federal courts, and
it is no surprise that many of these legislators expressed relief rather than
indignation after the justices decided the outcome. 27
A related version of this interpretation is offered by those who characterize
the Supreme Court's intervention as necessary and appropriate to avoid a
constitutional crisis, or at least to end a prolonged political crisis that had tried the
patience of the country and was not likely to result in a different outcome if it
continued through the process of counting (and challenging) electoral votes in the
Congress.28 This version is different because it characterizes the political benefits
for elected officials in a more bipartisan way. Rather than assume that Republican
officials were supportive of the Court because it prevented them from having to
face the possibility of handing the election to Bush after a Gore recount victory,
the argument suggests that both Democrats and Republicans may have been
relieved that the dispute was channeled into the Supreme Court rather than remain
in the legislative branches. This interpretation probably overstates the extent to
25 On December 7, the New York Times reported that "Republicans here [in Florida] were
worried about the potential fallout of convening a special session [of Bush electors]. They
emphasized their reluctance in choosing this course and spoke of waiting until the very last
moment." Dana Canedy & David Barstow, Florida Lawmakers to Convene Special Session
Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2000, at A35; see also 36 DAYS, supra note 24, at 252-53.
Two days later, after the Florida Supreme Court ordered a state-wide recount of the undervote
ballots, the paper reported that "if Mr. Bush's slim lead in the election dwindles during the
recounting, the Republican leadership will have a much tougher time maintaining discipline
among a rank and file composed largely of rookie legislators and those whose districts voted for
Mr. Gore." Dana Canedy & David Barstow, Ruling Fuels G.O.P. Resolve to Appoint Electors
and Democrats' Will to Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at A 14; see also 36 DAYS, supra note
24, at 271. Hours before the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Bush v. Gore,
Republican state Senator Jim Home said that he hoped "the Supreme Court would unilaterally
slam dunk this thing so we could all go home." Jeffrey Gettleman, Florida House OKs Slate of
Electors Beholden to Bush, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at A28.
2 6 House Republican Whip Tom Delay started organizing his colleagues just one week
after election day. See 36 DAYS, supra note 24, at 83.
2 7 See 36 DAYS, supra note 24, at 310 ("[M]ost politicians from both sides express relief
that the drama is over .... [E]specially ... members of the U.S. House and the Florida Senate,
who would have been involved in making decisions that carried considerable political danger
for all concerned.").
28 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 254-55.
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which congressional Democrats actually supported the Court's intervention,
although it might capture the sentiments of some Democrats-particularly more
moderate or conservative Senate Democrats from states that supported Bush in
the election-who had little enthusiasm for a Gore presidency and little interest in
challenging House Republicans in a way that threatened a deadlock. Still, the
argument offers another perspective on how the judiciary's independence can
provide political benefits that would lead potentially competing power-holders to
defer to judges when they address sensitive or controversial disputes.
III. LESSON THREE:
BECAUSE INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE IS NEVER COMPLETE-AND IS
EASILY OVERCOME BY DETERMINED POWER-HOLDERS-NOMINALLY
INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKERS STILL NEED TO ASSESS THEIR POLITICAL
CONTEXT BEFORE CHOOSING POLITICALLY RISKY COURSES OF ACTION
Supreme Court justices are privileged to have an institutional setting that
insulates them from direct political supervision or manipulation. "Good behavior"
tenure, combined with having the last word on the interpretation of law in a given
case cycle and the difficulties of mustering a consensus to retaliate against the
Court, mean that the justices have enormous freedom to decide cases as they see
fit. In fact, it is precisely these structural features that make it reasonable to
assume that justices normally decide cases based mostly on their personal policy
preferences (or views of the law) rather than other political motivations or
influences, such as direct constituency pressures or the demands of party
leaders. 29
However, all structural protections for political independence can be
overcome by sufficiently determined power-holders. Those who might threaten
judicial autonomy are usually not tempted to interfere, both because judges
typically decide cases that are of little interest to other power-holders (and thus
benefit from the same considerations that protect low-level bureaucrats) and
because judges typically decide more politically-sensitive issues in a way that is
broadly consistent with the preferences of other power-holders. Nonetheless, on
occasion, judges find themselves in situations that threaten to disturb the hornet's
nest of politics.30 In such situations, the normal practice of deciding cases as a
29 See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress
and Courts, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 28, 42 (1997).
30 One familiar example involved the reaction of leading Republicans and Democrats to a
decision of District Court Judge Harold Baer, Jr., after an evidentiary ruling that resulted in the
suppression of a large amount of cocaine. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 242-
43 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated on reconsideration, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). President
Clinton threatened to ask for the judge's resignation, and Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole
indicated that the judge should be impeached if he did not reverse himself. The assault led this
life-tenured judge to retreat on his ruling. For more on this and other examples, including House
20031
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judge sees fit may give way to a more complicated set of strategic calculations. 31
This is why, despite their nominal structural independence, Supreme Court
justices are demonstrably attentive to the political environment within which they
operate.32
Sometimes this results in outright refusal to decide cases that might trigger
political retaliation, as with the justices' initial decision to avoid the issue of
miscegenation in the wake of the regional firestorm surrounding Brown v. Board
of Education.33 Sometimes these political calculations result in strategic retreats
from incipient policies that are under assault, as with the Court's decision in the
late 1950s to pull back from offering modest due process protections to those who
refused to cooperate with the House Un-American Activities Committee.34 And
sometimes the justices' assessment leads them to conclude that the climate is
conducive to risky courses of action, either because they believe there is not
enough political will to challenge the Court on the issue or because they believe
majority whip Tom DeLay's general threat to begin impeaching "activist" federal judges, see
Stephan 0. Kline, Judicial Independence: Rebuffing Congressional Attacks on the Third
Branch, 87 Ky. L.J. 679, 714 (1998-99); Monroe I. Freedman, The Threat to Judicial
Independence by Criticism of Judges-A Proposed Solution to the Real Problem, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 729, 737-40 (1997); Don Van Natta, Jr., Under Pressure, Federal Judge Reverses
Decision in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al.
31 It is not always the case that judges will act cautiously or strategically when faced with
potentially explosive issues. Consider the more recent case of Newdow v. US. Congress, in
which the Ninth Circuit declared unconstitutional school children's exposure to the phrase
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. See 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). For an overview of
the reaction to this decision, including Senator Frank Murkowski's plan to divide the Ninth
Circuit in two, see Henry Weinstein, Judge Defuses Tenrion over Court's Pledge Ruling, L.A.
TIMES, July 17, 2002, at B I; and Michelle Munn, Don't Split 9th Circuit, House Panel is Told,
L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2002, at B8. Munn reports the following statement made by Democratic
Rep. Howard L. Berman at a committee hearing on dividing the Ninth Circuit: "One could take
these unique circumstances of the calling of the hearing and conclude it is an attempt to punish
the Ninth Circuit for its decision on the Pledge of Allegiance." Munn, supra at B8. Of course, it
is not possible to know whether the two judges who ruled against the phrase "under God"
would have made the same decision if they had anticipated the political consequences.
32 This aspect of Supreme Court politics is best captured in the literature on strategic
decision-making by the justices. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES
MAKE 13 (1998). For an earlier treatment, see WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL
STRATEGY 245-68 (1964).
33 See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955); 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956). Frankfurter
expressed the view in conference that "[t]o thrust the miscegenation issue into 'the vortex of the
present disquietude' would risk 'thwarting or seriously handicapping the enforcement of
[Brown].' "Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 4, 1955), reprinted in Dennis J.
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-
1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 64 (1979).
34See WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 229-30 (1962); C. HERMAN
PRITCHETr, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT 48-53 (1961).
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they can count on some protection from defenders who occupy strategically
useful positions.
It is tempting to think that the political climate of the 2000 election was not
conducive to a risky course of conduct by a bare majority of Court conservatives.
No precedent existed for Supreme Court involvement in a dispute over a state's
presidential electors.35 Established processes were in place for resolving the
dispute without the Court's participation--specifically, an initial resolution by
state office-holders followed by a determination by the Congress. The legal issues
raised were innovative and deeply disputed, and as it turned out, the justices were
unable to arrive at a nominally non-partisan consensus on how best to address
these issues. Moreover, despite arguments that there was a bipartisan interest in
having the Court bring an end to a prolonged crisis, there was reason to believe
that partisans on both sides would be upset with judges who took the wrong side.
In light of all this, it might be tempting to interpret the Court's involvement as
an example of how structural mechanisms for political independence make it
unnecessary for judges to take into account political considerations when deciding
a course of conduct. In fact, though, the strategic political environment was
actually quite hospitable to the course of conduct that the conservative majority
set in motion around Thanksgiving when they voted to grant certiorari in the first
Bush appeal of the Florida Supreme Court's decision to extend the deadline for
hand recounts.36 Assuming that the conservatives were interested in preventing
any hand recounts that might overturn the initially reported results in favor of a
Bush victory-an assumption that is consistent with the three anti-recount
positions taken by these five justices across three separate legal issues37 -then
35 Five justices (but not the Court as an institution) were involved in the Electoral
Commission that addressed the disputed Hayes-Tilden election in 1876. Even this limited
involvement by Court personnel was a byproduct of an explicit, formal invitation by
congressional party leaders.
36 The Florida Supreme Court's decision extending the recount deadline was Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1240 (Fla. 2000). The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari on November 24 in an appeal of the newly titled case Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 1004 (2000). In his Bush v. Gore dissent, in a part
of his opinion that was joined by all four dissenters, Justice Souter declared that "[t]he Court
should not have reviewed either Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board ... or this
case," which means that only the five most conservative justices supported the decision to
intervene in the election 2000 controversy. See Gillman, supra note 6, at 145-46 (quoting Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98. 130 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
37 In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, the justices overturned the Florida
Supreme Court's decision extending the deadline for manual recounts of votes using a legal
argument based on Article I of the Constitution. See 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000). In Bush v. Gore,
the conservatives issued an injunction stopping the newly-authorized statewide recount of
undervote ballots using a legal argument based on whether new recounts represented an
"irreparable harm" to Bush. See 531 U.S. 1046 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). And in the final
Bush v. Gore decision, the conservatives declared a statewide recount to be unconstitutional
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what they needed to assess was whether they had enough support in the political
system to avoid retaliation for a set of decisions that either blocked recounts or
rolled back the results of recounts. While the political environment might not
have been conducive to any imaginable course of conduct the Court might have
adopted (such as one to require recounts), it was conducive to an anti-recount
effort. The conservatives knew that they had a fully mobilized Republican
constituency that would vehemently support such an intervention. 38 More
importantly, Republicans were in control of virtually all of the potential
competing political institutions, including the state legislature and executive
branch of Florida and the U.S. House of Representatives. They also knew that the
U.S. Senate and, of course, the presidency would be in Republican hands if they
were successful in ensuring a Bush victory. Given this configuration of power, the
conservatives could be confident that their decisions would not be met by any
institutional resistance or short-term acts of retribution.
There were other strategic advantages as well. Immediately prior to the final
decision, public opinion polls showed that 73% of respondents said they would
consider any Supreme Court decision to be legitimate.39 Conservatives also knew
that a pro-Bush result would actually bring an immediate end to the dispute, since
the Gore campaign had announced the weekend before Bush v. Gore that they
would live with whatever decision the Court handed down. 40 While there might
be lingering anger among disappointed partisans, there would not be the sort of
ongoing struggle over judicial policy-making that one associates with the Court's
most controversial decisions.
In considering the lessons for judicial independence presented by Bush v.
Gore, it is too simple to assert that the formal, constitutional sources of the
justices' independence were sufficient to give the conservative majority the
political insulation it needed to intervene in the 2000 election controversy.
Counterfactuals can only reach so far, but if the 'Court had been faced with a fully
mobilized and determined Democratic Party in control of the U.S. Congress as
well as Florida's legislative and executive branches, the Bush v. Gore majority
would have had a lot more to consider before inserting themselves into this
process. The main point is that Supreme Court independence is a function, not
merely of formal structural protections, but also of historically contingent political
alignments and the tendency of the justices to assess the strategic context within
which they are operating. Without attention to these contextual and strategic
variables, a lack of pressure, interference, or retribution might be explained as a
using a legal argument based on the equal protection clause. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
103, 110 (2000).
38 For an account of the 2000 election that emphasizes the efforts of Republicans during
the election crisis, see JEFFREY TOOBIN, Too CLOSE TO CALL: THE THiRTY-Six-DAY BATTLE
TO DECIDE THE 2000 ELECTION (2001).
39 GILLMAN, supra note 6, at 128.
40 Id. at 129.
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function of well-functioning institutional barriers rather than the relation between
these structural features and the constraints or opportunities generated by the
background political climate.
IV. LESSON FOUR:
GREATER DEGREES OF STRUCTURAL INSULATION FROM ELECTORAL
ACCOUNTABILITY Do NOT NECESSARILY MAKE GOOD FAITH DECISION-
MAKING MORE LIKELY
It is tempting to assume that greater degrees of structural independence will
reduce the likelihood that political considerations will shape decision-making. In
other words, if independence is considered a good thing, then perhaps appointive
methods are better than elective methods; non-competitive retention elections are
better than competitive elections; and longer terms of office are better than shorter
terms. On this analysis, the federal structure of political appointment and life
tenure might seem like a better way to reduce the corrupting effects of politics on
judicial decision-making than state models that typically include some sort of
electoral accountability.
It is a truism that when judges are insulated from elections, some of the
dynamics of electoral politics are eliminated from their decision-making calculus.
Judges who do not have to run for election or reelection will not have to raise
money to run campaigns and may worry less about how their decisions might be
used by electoral opponents in political advertising. However, it would be a
mistake to assume that insulating judges from elections (or from easy removal by
competing power-holders) will eliminate political motivations, pressures, or
calculations from judicial decision-making. It would be more accurate to say that
different structures of judicial selection and removal will produce slightly
different political dynamics. Appointive systems marginally increase the
influence of chief executives over the ideological make-up of the judiciary,
although governors tend to dominate even elective and merit-based systems.
Partisan election systems provide voters with one very salient cue that they would
not be officially provided in non-partisan systems, although even in non-partisan
systems parties may exert influence over the process by supporting particular
candidates. Judges who enjoy life tenure have to worry less about whether voting
their preferences will cause a political firestorm, although even life-tenured judges
must pay attention to political opposition to their decisions.41 It may be that there
are good reasons to prefer the political dynamics associated with some of these
structures and to oppose those created by others, especially in light of the
41 For an overview, see LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY,
101-31 (5th ed. 1998).
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increasing importance of money in some judicial elections.42 However, in making
these comparisons, we should debate the relative advantages and disadvantages
associated with different political dynamics and try to avoid too much reliance on
misleading, simplistic sloganeering about the elimination of political influence.
The role of state and federal judges during the 2000 election controversy
provides a dramatic illustration of how greater degrees of political insulation do
not necessarily lead to less political judicial decision-making. Examining the
simple standard of whether judges were willing to decide cases inconsistently
with their presumptive political preferences, it is clear that the judges who faced
elections were much more willing to set aside their political preferences and offer
good-faith interpretations of the law than judges who enjoyed the most structural
"independence from politics." 43 For example, Florida Circuit Court Judge Terry
Lewis, a Democrat, ruled that the Republican Secretary of State had the authority
to disregard the results of manual recounts that were not completed until after a
seven-day reporting deadline. 44 Lewis, along with another Democratic appointee,
Circuit Court Judge Nikki Clark, also ruled against the Democrats in a lawsuit
challenging the legality of certain Republican absentee ballots.45 On the other
side, when Republicans initially attempted to get a judge to throw out these
absentee ballot challenges, they were disappointed by Judge Debra Nelson, who
was a recent appointee of Republican Governor Jeb Bush.46 At a time when the
standards for evaluating chads were thought to be the difference between a Gore
or a Bush victory, Republican state circuit Judge Jorge Labarga ruled that Palm
Beach violated Florida law when it decided to only count those ballots with
detached chads rather than any ballot where the intent of the voter could be
discerned.47
Obviously, there was a storm of controversy surrounding some of the
decisions of the Democratic Florida Supreme Court, especially when those
justices frustrated Republicans by authorizing recounts that threatened Bush's
42 For "an investigation into how campaign cash is corrupting America's courts," see
Frontline's "Justice For Sale" at http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/shows/jusice/ (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002).
43 For a more elaborate discussion of the issues raised in the next three paragraphs, see
Gillman, supra note 3, at 172-96.
44 McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, 2000 WL 1714590, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 17,
2000) (order denying emergency motion to compel compliance with and for enforcement of
injunction).
45 Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Bd., No. 00-2850, 2000 WL 1793409, at *5 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000) (final judgment for defendants); Scott Gold, Judges Let Absentee Votes
Stand, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 2000, at A26.
46 Mitchell Landsberg, Judge Upholds Democrat's Lawsuit over Absentee Applications,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000, at A16.
47 Florida Democratic Party v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., No. 00-11078, 2000
WL 1728721 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 15, 2000) (declaratory order).
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nominal victory. It is reasonable to assume that the commitment of those justices
to count ballots rather than disqualify ballots reflected their political attitudes.
Still, in the five cases that this state high court decided that might have influenced
the outcome of the controversy, the justices voted against Al Gore in three and
gave Gore only partial victories in the other two. The justices voted against Gore
on whether to order Miami-Dade to restart its recount after the local canvassing
board suddenly decided to call it off; on whether to order a new election in Palm
Beach County; and on whether to disqualify Republican absentee ballots.48 Gore
did get the state high court to approve an extension for when counties had to
report the results of manually reviewed ballots. However, the extension was not
as long as the Gore team hoped, and as it turned out, two of the three counties
involved could not complete the recounts within the extended time frame. 49 A
divided high court also authorized a statewide manual recount of the so-called
"undervote ballots," but this was less favorable to Gore (and set in motion a less
predictable course of action) than the limited recount in Democratic counties that
the Gore team had requested. 50 Whatever one's interpretation of the
reasonableness of any of these decisions, it is beyond dispute that these judges
were not single-minded about deciding cases in a manner that reflected a political
preference for one candidate over another. In cases where they voted against the
interests of Al Gore, it is reasonable to assume that the decision reflected their
good faith understanding of the law.
Of all the judges who were involved in the 2000 election dispute, the ones
whose behavior appeared the most partisan, and the least motivated by good faith
understandings of the law, were the ones who enjoyed the most extreme
insulation from conventional political pressure. The five conservatives in the Bush
v. Gore majority were the only judges involved in this election dispute whose
decisions across a variety of legal issues were consistent with their political
preferences and arguably inconsistent with their pre-election views on issues such
as the meaning of the equal protection clause and the appropriateness of having
federal courts second-guess state court interpretations of state law.51 Whether
these judges are viewed as loyal partisans, ideological policy-makers protecting
their fragile constitutional agenda, or, most benignly, interested decision-makers
48 The cases were as follows: Gore v. Miami-Dade County Canvassing Bd., 780 So. 2d
913 (Fla. 2000); Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (Fla.
2000); and Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. 2000).
49 Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
50 Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000).
51 The justices had no previously expressed views on the meaning of Article II as it relates
to the authority of state courts to interpret state election law regulating the appointment of
presidential electors. However, it is probably fair to say that no modem scholar of constitutional
law had an opinion on that question before the 2000 election.
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exhibiting the influence of "motivated reasoning," 52 it is hard to resist the
;conclusion that their actions were tainted by political considerations or
motivations. 53 This is just another way of pointing out that, while judicial
independence may sometimes free a judge fiom unwanted political pressure,
those structures do nothing to prevent an insulated judge from indulging her or his
own political preferences or private agendas. To guard against those unwanted
influences, one has to focus more on the character of the decision-maker than the
characteristics of the office.
None of this is to deny the importance of debating the practical consequences
of adopting one set of institutional structures over another. All power-holders are
affected in some way, whether positively or negatively, by the political
architecture of the institutions within which they operate. 54 Moreover, as these
issues are analyzed and debated, it is essential to consider the relationship
between these structural questions and the promotion of rule-of-law norms.
However, it also is useful to keep in mind the full range of motivations and
consequences that are related to the question of whether judge-politicians should
be given more or less decision-making autonomy. After all, "the choice ofjudicial
selection and retention mechanisms is inherently a political choice with political
implications," 55 including unintended implications, such as the use of that
independence to choose a president.
52 For a general discussion of the insights of cognitive psychology on judicial decision-
making, see Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J.
I (1998). Of course, one's susceptibility to the influences of motivated reasoning may itself be a
byproduct of a preexisting willingness to indulge political preferences. Therefore, the
phenomenon of motivated reasoning may not provide a persuasive defense against the charge
of partisan decision-making. Obviously, not all judges involved in the 2000 election framed the
legal issues in a politically convenient way.
53 It should be emphasized that the charge of partisan bias is not easily applied to
dissenting Justices David Souter and John Paul Stevens, each of whom were closely connected
to the Republican Party before being appointed by Republican presidents.
54 This is a central assumption of a political science school of thought known as "the new
institutionalism." See SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
APPROACHES (Comell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); see also THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Howard Gillman &
Comell W. Clayton eds., 1999).
55 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Olga Shvetsova, Selecting Selection Systems, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 2, at 201.
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